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1. Introduction
While incomplete contracts between principals and agents have been studied extensively
in economics, the connection between payments and monitoring in such relationships
has only attracted limited attention. Given the importance of an optimal mix of direct
monetary incentives (like wages in an employer-employee relation) and monitoring, the
scarcity of empirical work is surprising. It is even more astonishing in light of the fact
that the intuitive notion according to which monitoring and pay are substitutes is far
less obvious than it seems at first sight. Conventional wisdom would predict that workers
who cannot be monitored properly have to be well paid in order to avoid shirking, and
conversely, workers who act under close scrutiny do not have to be paid above market-
clearing wages. However, whether wages and supervisors are substitutes or complements
has long been an unclear issue both theoretically and empirically, although it is obviously
key for understanding labor markets with imperfectly enforceable contracts.1
In this paper we will rely on laboratory experiments to empirically assess incomplete
contracts that incorporate a possibility for costly monitoring. On a posted offer market,
principals can offer contracts that specify a wage and a monitoring probability following
a shirking detection technology as well as a desired non-binding effort level to be exerted
by the agent. After having accepted a contract, agents have to submit an effort level, and
a random mechanism according to the monitoring probability determines whether the
agent is actually monitored. We implement a simple static model of the shirking version
of the efficiency wage hypothesis in which the short side of the market is labor demand.
As already mentioned, our main focus is on the question whether wages and monitoring
are indeed substitutes as intuition predicts or rather complements. For this end, we put
four treatments with different parameterizations of productivity and monitoring costs
to an experimental test. These four settings can be viewed as representing a range of
different industries or firms that naturally exhibit different combinations of productivity
and monitoring costs.
The experimental design that we use is related to Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1996),
Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997), Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2007), and Fehr and
Gächter (2002). Two distinctive features of our approach render our results, however,
more general: (i) we apply an endogenous monitoring technology, and (ii) we implement,
1 The terms "principal" and "employer" as well as "agent" and "employee" are used interchangeably
throughout the paper. The same holds for the expressions "monitoring" and "supervision" as well as
"pay" and "wage".
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as far as we know for the first time, truly continuous effort (costs) for the agent. Therefore,
we believe that our experimental test on contractual design and the effects of reciprocity
is the most general, so far.
It were Allgulin and Ellingsen (2002), who challenged the conventional wisdom of the
substitutive relation between wages and monitoring. Their theoretical model shows that
monitoring and the level of pay are negatively related, i.e. substitutes, only under two
restrictive assumptions that have, however, been common in the previous literature: (i)
workers only have a choice between two effort levels (working or shirking), and (ii) the
desirable level of a worker’s effort is given exogenously. In the more general case, in which
workers can choose from a continuum of effort levels and in which the desirable level of
effort emerges from the solution to the firm’s profit maximization, complementarity of
supervision and pay results, regardless of which of the model’s parameters is varied, at
least as long as common knowledge of rationality and selfishness is assumed.
However, to what extent their results are indicative for actual behavior of subjects in
principal-agent relations involving both a compensation and a costly monitoring option is
an open question. In reality, behavioral regularities such as reciprocity (a positive wage-
or rent-effort correlation) or, more general, social preferences have been shown to play
an important role in shaping principal-agent relationships (among the first experiments
is Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993); for a recent field experiment see, e.g., Bellemare
and Shearer (2009)). The existence of social preferences might completely overturn the
theoretical conclusion with regard to the complementarity of monitoring and pay. It is,
for instance, straightforward to show that a sufficient number of reciprocal agents in
the population renders any monitoring simply unnecessary, leading principals to offer
contracts in equilibrium that do not involve any monitoring.
Therefore, it is ultimately a matter of empirical analysis to substantiate whether
monitoring and pay are actually complements or rather substitutes (see also, e. g., Chang
and Lai, 1999; Demougin and Fluet, 2001). The most desirable approach to answer this
question would involve the analysis of field data on contracts and effort exertion. Unfor-
tunately, by using field data one has to cope with quite a few serious problems that are
common to tests of efficiency wage models. For instance, with field data the accuracy of
monitoring is difficult to measure properly, effort levels are not easy to classify, and entry
costs may create a severe sample selection bias (see Allgulin and Ellingsen, 2002). There-
fore, also Prendergast (1999) argues that it is very difficult to assess the issue with data
from the field (p. 45): "The problem is that either may easily arise in a world of efficiency
wages and depends critically on the source of variation across firms. On the one hand, if
the source of variation across firms is the cost of supervisors, then the two instruments
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are likely to be substitutes, where firms substitute away from high-cost supervisors into
wages. On the other hand, if the source of variation across firms is in the return to effort
(so some firms value effort exertion more than others), those firms that want more effort
will use more of both instruments relative to those that do not values such high effort."
Using an experiment is, thus, a remedy and can be viewed as a valuable complement to
existing empirical studies.
The results of our experiment reveal that although wages are generally too high and
the monitoring probability is too low in comparison to the theoretical predictions under
selfishness assumptions, participants behavior is qualitatively in line with the theory,
especially when we look at within treatment variation. Analyzing the within treatment
variation, we find a clear and highly significant positive correlation between monitoring
and pay. Thus, the predictions of the shirking model are confirmed, and monitoring
and supervision are indeed complements. Yet, we also observe evidence for the existence
of reciprocity, for which the too high wages and too low monitoring intensity are first
indications. But also more elaborate tests confirm the existence of reciprocity among
principals and agents. It is, however, important to note that relying on reciprocity alone
is not an optimal strategy for principals in our one-shot setting without an option to
build reputation. The principals’ earnings are at least as high when they design a contract
with enforceable effort as when they invested the same amount of money in the labor
relationship but offer a higher wage and monitor less. A striking feature of the data is
that, although the reciprocity hypothesis is confirmed, contracts without monitoring fare
particularly badly, and this is not a consequence of self-selection of different types of
agents into contract offers with and without monitoring. A low intensity of monitoring,
however, goes a long way, i.e. strengthens reciprocity a lot. Another finding in line with the
existing literature is that the degree of reciprocity is highly heterogeneous across subjects.
In other words, the wage-effort relation is by no means the same for all participants.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. In section 2 we present briefly
Allgulin and Ellingsen’s (2002) shirking model with continuous effort and endogenous
monitoring levels on which our experiment relies. Section 3 reviews existing empirical and
experimental evidence on our research question in turn. The details of our experimental
design, our hypotheses and the laboratory protocol are presented in sections 4 and 5.
Section 6 is devoted to the presentation of the results of our experiment, and section
7 discusses implications of them in the context of existing empirical and experimental
studies.
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2. Theory
2.1. The shirking model
The general shirking model of the efficiency-wage hypothesis is motivated by the dynamic
dimension of the labor relationship. It assumes that the principal proposes a contract
{wt; t = 0, 1, . . . ,+∞}, specifying the wage the employee will receive at each date t. If
the agent is caught shirking she is paid to the end of the period and dismissed, thereafter.
Note that the shirker receives her compensation for that last period even if she has
not exerted any effort. This assumption is an upshot of the unverifiable character of
production, which prevents employers from proposing a remuneration solely based on
results. The optimal contract of this dynamic model implies zero rent for the worker at
date t = 0. But in all subsequent periods, the agent obtains a utility that is strictly
greater than her utility from being unemployed (see Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2003).
In the following we present a simplified static version of the shirking model (based
on Allgulin and Ellingsen (2002)), in which optimal effort and supervision intensity arise
endogenously. We consider a bilateral interaction between a risk-neutral principal and
a risk-neutral agent.2 Both maximize their own utility. The principal wants to delegate
some work e˜ to an agent and offers her a compensation w(e). Further he can invest some
money µM(p) in a monitoring technology that allows him to verify with an investment-
dependent probability p whether the agent falls short of the desired effort e˜. Effort
determines the principal’s benefit βB(e) at some cost to the agent ζC(e). We make the
following standard assumptions regarding the functional forms: (i) B′(e) > 0,B′′(e) 6 0,
(ii) C(0) = 0,C′(e) > 0,C′′(e) > 0, (iii) M′(p) > 0.
The ex-post utility of the principal can be expressed by
Π = βB(e) −w(e) − µM(p), (1)
and the ex-post utility of the agent is
U = w(e) − ζC(e). (2)
The compensation w(e) has a lower limit w which may be due to a wealth constraint or
legal rules. Further, since effort is not always observed, the compensation contract has
2 Assuming risk-neutrality is also innocuous when deriving specific predictions for our experiment. If
experimental participants were not close to risk-neutral over the monetary domain at stake in our exper-
iments, we would have to accept ridiculously high risk-aversion levels for higher stake levels according
to calibration results in Rabin (2000).
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to specify some payment w that the agent receives in this case. Though it is irrelevant
for the agent’s incentives, we assume w = w(e˜) as is common in the literature. However,
the principal would have an incentive not to monitor if we allowed w < w(e˜). The agent
maximizes expected utility,
E[U] = pw(e) + (1− p)w− ζC(e). (3)
The following incentive compatibility constraint must be satisfied for all e if the
principal is free to induce any level of effort e˜:
pw(e˜) + (1− p)w− ζC(e˜) > pw(e) + (1− p)w− ζC(e). (4)
A step function of the form w(e) = w for e < e˜ and w(e) = w for e > e˜ can replicate any
incentive compatible contract that implements e˜ without loss to the principal, i. e. the
agent gets w if she meets or exceeds the target and the minimum payment w otherwise.
If an agent wants to deviate, she will always deviate to e = 0. The incentive compatibility
constraint thus becomes
p(w−w) > ζC(e˜). (5)
We assume that an indifferent agent will exert the desired effort level. Thus, the incentive
compatibility constraint becomes an equality from which we obtain the actual effort the
principal will be able to enforce,
e(p,w) = C−1((w−w)p/ζ). (6)
His problem, then, is to find a probability p and a wage w to maximize
Π(p,w) = βB(e(p,w)) −w− µM(p) (7)
subject to w > w and p ∈ [0, 1]. Let r(e) = βB′(e)/ζC′(e), then the first order conditions
for the solution are
p?r(e?) − 1 6 0 with equality if w? > w, and (8)
(w? −w)r(e?) − µM′(p?) > 0 with equality if p? < 1. (9)
Allgulin and Ellingsen (2002) prove the following propositions. First, the marginal
benefit from increased effort will be larger than the marginal cost whenever the principal
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chooses to monitor imperfectly. Second, there must be a positive level of monitoring
in order to induce any effort. Third, sufficient conditions for monitoring and pay to be
complementary instruments are: (i) the principal’s benefit function B(e) and the agent’s
cost of effort function C(e) are both represented by power functions; (ii) the principal’s
benefit function B(e) is linear, and the relative growth of costs of effort is decreasing
in the effort level; (iii) if the source of variation is β or µ, monitoring and pay are
complementary instruments if and only if −p?M′′(p?)/M′(p?) < 1.
2.2. Taking social preferences into account
Let us extend Allgulin and Ellingsen (2002) and also analyze the interaction in the
presence of reciprocity and/or fairness. Although we do not intend to go into the details
of various theories that take social preferences into account, it may be helpful to briefly
provide an intuitive prediction – though based on a rigorous model – of the impact of
reciprocity or fairness on behavior in the principal-agent relationship.
Intention-based fairness models (starting with Rabin, 1993) would predict that people
who are motivated by reciprocal fairness are willing to sacrifice resources to be kind to
others who are perceived to act kindly (positive reciprocity) and to be unkind to or to
punish those who are perceived to act unkindly (negative reciprocity). It is, however,
difficult to derive clear point-predictions from them in dynamic games.
An alternative class are outcome-based models in which the usual utility function is
extended by elements that take the monetary payoff of other players into account. The
most influential are Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Since both
would yield very similar predictions, we focus only on one of the two in the following,
namely the Fehr-Schmidt model that is also a simplification of an earlier model proposed
by Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman (1989). It basically assumes that people care
about inequity, but to a different extent. In the two-player case the utility function of
the Fehr-Schmidt model is given by
Ui(x) = xi − αimax{xj − xi, 0}− γimax{xi − xj, 0} (10)
with i ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, where x = (x1, x2) denotes the vector of monetary payoffs, and we
assume γi 6 αi, 0 6 γi 6 1. In the utility function the first term after xi measures the
utility loss that stems from inequity to i’s disadvantage and the last term measures the
loss from advantageous inequity.
For the sake of succinctness let us – following Fehr et al. (2007) – simply assume that
there is a fraction q ∈ [0, 1] of fair people in the population that exhibit αi > γi > 0.5,
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i. e. they have a willingness to pay in order to achieve equality. The rest of the population,
i. e. 1 − q people, is purely selfish with αi = γi = 0. Consider a selfish principal who
deliberates whether a wage level above the benchmark equilibrium would induce an
agent to raise the chosen effort level. Assume for the moment that p = 0, i. e. there
is no monitoring (that is what Fehr et al. (2007) call a trust contract). A fair agent
who accepts a generous trust contract will choose an effort level that equalizes her own
monetary payoff with the monetary payoff of the principal. Thus,
Π = βB(e) −w(e) − µM(p) = w(e) − ζC(e) = U (11)
By using the implicit function theorem, one obtains
de
dw
=
2
βB ′(e) + ζC ′(e)
(12)
Since de/dw > 0 for all relevant parametrizations for a fair agent, e always increases
with w. The important question, however, is whether the marginal effect on a principal’s
profit is greater than one. With a fraction q of fair agents, an increase of w by one unit
increases average effort by
q
de
dw
=
2q
βB ′(e) + ζC ′(e)
(13)
and the principal’s profit by
βq
de
dw
=
2βq
βB ′(e) + ζC ′(e)
(14)
If βqde/dw = 2βq/[βB ′(e)+ζC ′(e)] > 1, a higher wage level pays off even for a completely
selfish principal. For an inequity averse principal a similar reasoning applies. It is, how-
ever, a bit more complicated, because inequity averse principals have to take the marginal
effect of reciprocal behavior by the agent into account when deciding on w in order to
be able to equalize the two earning levels.
The arguments become a little less straightforward when incentive contracts that
incorporate a positive monitoring probability are under investigation. Selfish principals
would offer the optimal contract {p∗,w∗, e∗} if all agents were selfish. If however some
agents are fair, they run the risk that those agents might not accept their offers. Again,
higher wage levels might, therefore, pay off for selfish principals according to similar
conditions as for contracts without monitoring. In case of monitoring, principals can,
however, also equalize their payoff with the payoff of agents by setting the monitoring
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probability above equilibrium levels (where "equilibrium" refers to the standard solution
with selfish principals and agents) and thereby creating fair contracts. Whether this
would be perceived as fair by agents is, however, a question that cannot be answered in
the Fehr-Schmidt framework. Depending on the parameters and especially on q, fairness
equilibria with above-equilibrium monitoring may be Pareto-dominated by other fair
contracts with equilibrium monitoring levels and above-equilibrium wages.
How will a fair principal decide? If the marginal effect of a wage increase on his profit
is smaller than one (i. e. higher wages do not pay off in monetary terms), then he will
choose the equilibrium monitoring probability to induce the equilibrium effort choice by
the agent, but a higher wage that will equally divide the surplus among the two. If the
marginal effect is greater than one, the same intuition as for selfish principals applies.
Summing up the discussion on reciprocity and fairness, it is important to note that
fairness motives are able to shift wages, efforts (and possibly monitoring levels) upwards
in comparison to the standard solution, depending on the parameters of the game, the
underlying functions and the fraction of fair people in the population. A short discussion,
whether an upward shift is actually possible for our parameter choices is relegated to
Section 4.
What can we say about the complementarity or substitutability of monitoring and
pay in the presence of fair players? Since both standard equilibria and fairness equilibria
(also without any monitoring) are possible, the answer is somehow unsatisfactory from
a theoretical viewpoint, but reassuring for our claim that the question is ultimately
empirical: Monitoring and pay might be both substitutes and complements, depending
again upon parameters, specific functions and the fraction of fair people in the population
as well as the conditions derived for the standard solution.
3. Existing empirical and experimental evidence
3.1. Empirical evidence
As already mentioned, there are not many empirical studies investigating the effect of
incentives and monitoring on performance. This is mainly due to some major econometric
challenges. As Athey and Stern (1998) show, approaches that have been most commonly
used in the literature can yield misleading results when one allows for complementarities
between choice variables as well as unobserved factors that affect marginal costs and
benefits of each individual choice. Although these issues can be dealt with theoretically,
the requirements for field data are rather high.
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One major challenge, e. g., is how to measure monitoring intensity. A common ap-
proach is to use the ratio of non-production to production employees (see, e. g., Gor-
don, 1990). However, this is only an approximation. Many of those included in the
non-production category may have little or nothing to do with direct employee supervi-
sion. Other measures include self-reports and measures of job autonomy that aggregate
whether the employee has discretion over her work pace, whether she has to use a time-
keeping system, and whether she has flexible working time.
Given the problems with field data, it is not very suprising that empirical results so
far are inconclusive. While Sessions (2008) finds an inverse relationship of monitoring
and pay in the British 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey this relationship
diminishes under profit sharing schemes. Groshen and Krueger (1990) also find evidence
in favor of the traditional efficiency wage model that predicts substitutability of pay
and monitoring by looking at hospital employee data. The wages of staff nurses tend
to fall with increasing supervision. Further, Rebitzer (1995) provides evidence that high
levels of supervision are associated with lower wage levels by focusing on data from the
petrochemical industry. Analyzing the data from a national survey, Kruse (1992) also
finds a negative correlation between supervision and pay, and Arai (1994a,b) shows that
higher wage premia are associated with a larger fraction of autonomous jobs, where the
level of autonomy is used as a proxy for monitoring intensity.
This does, however, not hold for the public sector, and in particular not for white-
collar workers. Using survey data of employment conditions in the high-technology sector
of a US state, Leonard (1987) shows that the traditional efficiency wage model is only
weakly supported and that it fails to explain the high intra-industry dispersion. And even
though Neal (1993) cannot provide direct evidence that wage premia are not substitutes
for monitoring activity as implied by traditional efficiency wage models, his empirical
assessment does not support the derived hypothesis that inter-industry differences in
monitoring contribute to inter-industry wage differentials. Finally, Gordon (1990) finds
support for labor-discipline models, i. e. that pay and monitoring are complements.
The results of a survey by Minkler (2004) indicates that shirking in firms may not
be as much of a problem as suggested by standard economic theory (see, e. g., Eaton
and White, 1983). According to his results, moral and intrinsic motivation are very im-
portant determinants of workers’ behavior. These forces are, however, more thouroughly
investigated in experimental studies. Some of these studies are discussed in the following
subsection.
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3.2. Experimental evidence
Previous experiments on shirking and explicit incentives in a gift-exchange environment
include Fehr et al. (1997), Fehr et al. (2007), Fehr and Gächter (2002), and based on more
formal principal-agent models, Fehr et al. (1996), Keser and Willinger (2000), Anderhub,
Gächter and Königstein (2002), as well as Dickinson and Villeval (2008).
The experimental designs of Fehr et al. (1996, 2007), and Fehr and Gächter (2002)
share one peculiar and important design feature: They restrict the action space to vari-
ations of the fine in case of verified shirking instead of allowing for different degrees of
monitoring. Legal constraints in real life may, however, lead to exactly the opposite. The
fine may be fixed at some agreed upon level or might be implicitly given by the loss of
rent when being dismissed, while the employer may have almost full decision autonomy
regarding the intensity of supervision. In fact, penalty schemes are rare on labor markets,
with the exception of the penalty of getting fired.
The results of the above-mentioned experiments that incorporate an endogenous con-
tract choice indicate that incentive contracts framed as bonus contracts are preferred over
contracts framed as penalty contracts (for a discussion see also Luft, 1994). They also
show that trust contracts, i. e. contracts without explicit incentives, are rarely chosen by
the employer. Although in about one fourth of all incentives contracts the agent shirks,
the studies provide mixed results concerning the average effort level under the differ-
ent contract types. With an endogenous contract choice, effort is higher under incentive
contracts, while effort is higher under trust contracts with exogenous contract choice.
This observation is somewhat puzzling. If one assumes that the intentional choice of
the contract design determines how the contract conditions are perceived - which is an
implication of assuming that intentional kindness, i. e. high wages, leads to reciprocally
kind reactions, i. e. a high effort choice - one would also expect that choosing a trust
contract is perceived as kinder than choosing an incentive contract. This, however, would
imply higher effort levels under trust contracts with endogenous contract choice and,
thus, contradicts the above observation. See also Bénabou and Tirole (2003) for a formal
discussion on why explicit incentives may be counterproductive, and Dickinson and Vill-
eval (2008) for some evidence showing that too high monitoring intensities may, indeed,
crowd out intrinsic motivation.
Keser and Willinger (2000) test a standard moral hazard model in the laboratory. In
their experiment the agent can choose between two hidden actions that entail either low
or high costs for the agent and on which the stochastic realization of either low or high
gains for the principal depends. The principal offers an outcome-contingent contract, i. e.
two wage levels, either of which is paid if low or high gains are realized. Note that this
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kind of contract closely resembles a bonus contract. Keser and Willinger observe that
the offered contracts show the following features: The wage contingent on high gains is
at least as high as the wage contingent on low gains, as it is required by theory. Agents
do not have to risk a loss. And finally, the net profit of agents is not higher than the net
profit of principals.
A further study on explicit incentives and contract design has been conducted by
Anderhub et al. (2002). Principals offer a contract that consists of a wage, a profit share,
and a non-binding desired effort level. The contracts are restricted to the space of linear
contracts. However, incentive compatible contracts that induce efficiency are feasible and
optimal. Agents have a piece-wise linear, convex effort-cost function that allows identi-
fying a limited number of conditionally rational effort choices. The authors observe that
principals offer incentive compatible return shares and ask for negative wages, i. e. entry
fees. Agents often choose best reply efforts. According to Anderhub et al. deviations from
the normative solutions can be explained by reciprocity. More generous contracts lead to
a higher probability that agents act reciprocal, i. e. the deviations from conditionally ra-
tional effort choices are positively correlated with the surplus share. Agents reject unfair
contracts and principals respond by offering contracts that are fairer than predicted by
the theoretically optimal contract design under the selfishness assumption. Consequently,
earnings are less asymmetrically distributed than predicted. This indicates that vertical
fairness concerns may influence contract design and incentives. However, participants
have symmetric and complete surplus information, a design feature that may at least
partly drive the results.
Let us complete the discussion of laboratory results with three papers investigating
the effect of different productivities and effort costs. Hannan, Kagel and Moser (2002)
extend the basic design of the gift exchange game (see Fehr et al., 1993) by introducing
low and high productivity firms. In their laboratory experiment workers do not provide
more effort to lower productivity firms even though it is relatively more costly for these
firms to offer higher wages. This is in contrast to the results of Gneezy (2004) and
Dittrich and Ziegelmeyer (2006). In a standard laboratory gift exchange game experiment
where they implemented different productivities in a between subjects design Dittrich
and Ziegelmeyer (2006) observe behavior consistent with inequity aversion: The lower
the productivity, the higher is the average effort given the same wage. Gneezy conducts a
real-effort experiment in which the roles of employers and employees are assigned to MBA
and undergraduate students, respectively. For solving mazes (the treatment conditions are
two levels of difficulty: easy and hard) employees can be offered either 0, 5, or 10 dollars.
Employers earn 1 dollar for each solved maze. In a third treatment using the easy mazes,
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employers earn 3 dollars for each solved maze. Regardless of the treatment condition,
each remuneration is chosen with equal probability by the employers. There is a positive
relation between wage and the number of solved mazes as well as between wage and the
invested time. The employees’ effort levels depend on the return level. They invest the
same amount of time in the 1-dollar-per-maze treatment, but they reduce their effort in
the 3-dollar-per-maze treatment. However, total earnings of the employers increase with
the wage offer only in the 3-dollar-treatment. This supports Akerlof’s (1982) prediction
that only when the return on employees’ effort is sufficiently high, profits are increased
by wages above the market-clearing level.
Finally, there is also a piece of evidence on monitoring and shirking from controlled
field experiments. Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders and Taylor (2002) investigate how employees
of a call center company react to different exogenously given monitoring rates. They
observe that a significant fraction of employees respond to a reduction in the perceived
cost of opportunistic behavior by increased shirking. In contrast, employees with good
outside options do not increase shirking by more than other employees when the rate
of monitoring declines. Additionally, there also exists a significant number of employees
who do not respond at all to variations in the monitoring intensity. This shows that the
problem of shirking may indeed not be as problematic as predicted by theory, but it is
still prevalent and has to be taken care of by appropriate contract designs.
4. Hypotheses and experimental design
For our experiment we use the following parametrization that fulfill the above conditions
for pay and monitoring being complements in the theoretical solution. The benefit for
the employer of an effort e is
βB(e) = βe2/3, (15)
the cost function for the employee of an effort e is given by
ζC(e) = ζe3/2 with ζ = 1, (16)
and the cost of implementing a shirking detection probability p is
µM(p) = µp2. (17)
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Table 1: Normative solution under the different treatment conditions
β µ p? w? e? Π(p?,w?, e?) U(p?,w?, e?) Π? +U?
12 30 0.41 10.90 2.53 6.42 6.88 13.30
12 20 0.57 13.97 3.79 8.73 6.58 15.31
16 30 0.63 24.46 5.99 16.60 9.79 26.39
16 20 0.88 31.74 8.99 22.06 4.79 26.85
The minimal feasible effort level that an employee can exert if she is employed is e = 0.1.
The minimal compensation an employer can offer is w = 1. The experimental treatment
conditions are characterized by systematically varying the values of β and µ in a balanced
2×2 between-subjects design. More specifically, β will take either the value 12 or 16, and
µ will take either the value 20 or 30. The motivation for the parameter variation is to
picture different productivity and monitoring costs combinations. The normative solution
of the shirking model assuming selfishness and using these parameters is presented in table
1. Since the task is not easy, we cannot expect that participants will find the optimal
contract immediately. Though, they should converge over time to one of the equilibria
presented in Section 2.
Let us now briefly turn to the issue of fairness. The main task here is to check for
our parameter choices whether βqde/dw = 2βq/[βB ′(e)+ζC ′(e)] > 1. If this is the case,
even selfish principals will offer above-equilibrium wages to induce higher effort levels
by agents. It can be shown that for our functions and β-values, q > 0.4 suffices to
satisfy the condition for almost all effort levels.3 It is noteworthy that q = 0.4 is exactly
the aggregated calibration result in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). We, therefore, expect to
observe a positive effort-wage correlation in our data and non-minimal effort levels, even
without an investment in monitoring. Furthermore, if reciprocity is strong enough, i. e.
the effort-wage slope steep enough, profits should be higher without monitoring than
with monitoring for any given effort level.
However, as the employer might want to insure himself against exploitation (e. g., as
a consequence of being let-down averse), he will monitor, but also offer a higher wage
to induce non-shirking behavior of employees. This means that contracts will rather
be characterized by lower than equilibrium monitoring and/or higher than equilibrium
wages.
3 Notice that the marginal costs of effort provision C ′(e) is not constant in our framework, which leads to
different results for different effort levels. With q = 0.4 the condition, however, holds for any e > 1.
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5. Experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted computerized using the software package zTree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007) at the University of Innsbruck. Participants were randomly recruited
from the undergraduate population of the university. In total 124 students participated
in the experiment. In any of the eight sessions that constitute one independent observa-
tion each either 18 or, due to some no-show-ups, 14 students participated.4 There were,
however, always two employees more on the labor market than employers.
Upon arrival, students were seated at screened computer terminals divided by blinds.
The instructions were distributed and read aloud by one experimenter. They were framed
in terms of a labor market in order to make the experiment less abstract and easier
to understand for the participants. A specimen of the experimental instructions can
be found in the Appendix. Then, participants were asked to answer a short control
questionnaire to assess whether they understood the experimental rules and, in particular,
the payoff determination. All participants had to pass this test. For being successful, they
earned 3 e . Since it was possible to incur losses, the participants’ attention was explicitly
invited to this point. Participants had to agree to cover any losses immediately after the
experiment.5 Before the first period, subjects were assigned to their roles. They kept their
roles throughout the whole experiment. Yet, subjects were completely anonymous and
not identifiable, i.e. it was impossible to build reputation for either side of the market.
The sequence of actions within any period was: First, employers simultaneously de-
cided on the offered contract, i. e. the level of monitoring p, the wage level w to offer, and
the desired effort level e˜. To facilitate the task, we restricted the parameter domain of
variables for the participants. In particular we used p ∈ [0, 1], w ∈ [1, 83], and e as well
as e˜ ∈ [0.1, 12] After the contract offer phase all offers were made public to the workers.
One after another (in random order with the probability distribution being i.i.d. across
periods) they could, then, choose to accept any still available contract or to reject all
standing offers. As soon as one worker accepted a contract offer, the offer was not avail-
able for any other worker. This posted offer market stage ended either after all contracts
were accepted or all unemployed workers had rejected the still available contracts. Subse-
quently, all employed workers chose their effort level by moving a slider on a continuous
4 There were 5 sessions with 14 participants and 3 sessions with 18 participants. The distribution over
the four treatments is almost perfectly balanced: Only in the treatment with low productivity and low
monitoring costs we had two sessions with 14 participants and none with 18. For every other treatment
we had one session with 14 and one session with 18 participants. In our analysis we always tested for a
session size effect. The respective variable was never significant.
5 No student declined to participate due to this requirement. In case of losses they were willing to pay
their debts immediately.
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scale. Finally, uncertainty about monitoring was resolved, and payoffs were determined
according to the actions of the participants and the chance move.
In order to facilitate calculations the computer program offered the participants the
following help: Employers were provided with a calculator for the monitoring costs, the
(desired) effort costs, and gross profits in case of both compliance and shirking. Thus,
subjects could design their contracts by comparing different contractual conditions and
choose the values that suited them best. By providing the gross profits in case of com-
pliance and shirking, we made sure that subjects were fully aware of possible gains and
losses. Employees were provided with a calculator for their effort costs as well as their
own and their employer’s earnings, given the accepted contract and the self-determined
effort level. Employees could, therefore, compare the results of exerting various effort lev-
els and choose the preferred. We believe that supplying our subjects with these pieces of
information was important to obtain more experienced choices and a faster convergence.
The alternative of playing more periods would have been less desirable.
After 15 periods the experiment ended, and participants were paid in private. A
typical session took less than 90 minutes. Note again that reputation building across
periods was impossible, i.e. we implemented repetition in order to account for possible
experience effects but the experiments actually captures one-shot interactions.
Since there are substantial differences in earning opportunities measured in experi-
mental points between the four treatments both at and off equilibrium, we used different
exchange rates. In the treatment with low productivity and high monitoring cost (hence-
forth, LPHM) experimental points were converted at an exchange rate of 7 points per
euro. In the treatment with low productivity and low monitoring cost (LPLM) the con-
version rate was 8 points per euro; and in both high productivity treatments (i. e. HPLM
and HPHM) the exchange rate was set to 13 points per euro. Consequently, the sum of
earnings in the equilibrium was approximately the same in all treatments while off equi-
librium earning opportunities differed substantially. Average earnings in the experiment
were e 8.64.
6. Experimental results
Let us first discuss contract offers. Figure 1 shows the distribution of contract offers in
monitoring probability and wage space. The black triangles denote the optimal contract
according to the normative solution under the selfishness assumption. It is immediately
clear from the figure that there is considerable variance in the data (which is also a con-
sequence of including all observations from the first interaction periods in our analysis).
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Note: The size of the bubbles is proportional to the number of observations. The black triangle denotes
the optimal contract according to the normative solution under the selfishness assumption.
Figure 1: Distribution of contracts in the monitoring probability and wage offer space
However, in the low monitoring cost treatments (LPLM, HPLM) contracts are rather
clustered around the optimal contract. In the high monitoring cost treatments (LPHM,
HPHM) offered wages seem to be too high. Further, in the low productivity conditions
(LPHM, LPLM), we find a substantial number of contracts that include no monitoring
(see also table 2). Yet, the clear majority of the contracts are incentive contracts.
As wage and monitoring probability are chosen simultaneously, we need to account
for this when we want to asses whether participants react to the treatment conditions and
whether this reaction is in the direction predicted by the model. We, therefore, estimate
an equation system on wage offers and monitoring probability by applying the seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR) approach, i.e. we allow the residual error terms of the wage
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Table 2: Frequency of accepted contracts without monitoring
Low Monitoring Cost High Monitoring Cost
Productivity Low High Low High
Monitoring >0 159 192 152 200
Probability 0 21 16 51 4
and monitoring equations to be correlated. To account for the dependency of the data
due to repeated measurement we apply the multilevel approach, i.e. we include error
terms at the matching group level, the subject level, and the (residual) observation level.
For comparison we also provide separate OLS regressions with cluster-robust standard
errors and separate multilevel regressions.6 The results are presented in table 3.
Despite the variance in the data that is apparent from figure 1 the regression results
provide clear evidence that, on average, participants reacted to the treatment variations
in the expected way. All main treatment effects have the right sign. As expected, the
effect of productivity on wages and monitoring probability is stronger than the corre-
sponding effect of monitoring costs. While productivity is significant in both, the wage
and the monitoring probability equation, monitoring costs is only significant in the mon-
itoring probability equation. The interaction effect of productivity and monitoring costs
is insignificant in both equations. Note that all three reported models show very simi-
lar treatment effects. Only the multilevel seemingly unrelated regression model shows a
larger deviation from the point estimates of the other two models as more of the data’s
variance is absorbed into the random effects. In the multilevel SUR model, especially the
time trends seem to be more subject-specific than systematic. The positive correlation of
the residuals between the wage offer and the monitoring probability equations is a first
indication that wages and monitoring are used as complements in contract design at the
individual level. We will investigate this in more detail later.
On the whole, contract choices are adjusted in the right direction, i. e. high produc-
tivity leads to higher wages and a higher monitoring probability, and low monitoring cost
leads to more intense monitoring and higher wages. Although the impact of monitoring
costs on wages is statistically not significant, it is in the direction predicted by the model.
However, wages are too high compared to the normative solution under the assumption
of selfishness in all treatments with the exception of HPLM, in which average wages
6 If in a set of linear equations all equations shared the same predictors the SUR approach would result in
the same estimates as obtained by separate OLS regressions. The multilevel approach to account for the
dependency structure of the data introduces, however, random predictors that are not necessarily the
same across all equations. Consequently, the SUR approach may increase the efficiency of the estimates.
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Table 3: Estimation of wage offer and monitoring probability
Wage Equation OLS Multilevel Multilevel-SUR
Intercept 19.519∗∗ 19.575∗∗ 20.032∗∗
(3.883) (3.413) (1.897)
High Productivity 14.729∗∗ 14.495∗∗ 14.389∗∗
(4.491) (4.799) (2.968)
Low Monitoring Cost 1.509 0.961 0.447
(4.024) (4.890) (2.967)
Period -1.180∗∗ -1.180∗∗ -0.689∗∗
(0.141) (0.292) (0.119)
High Productivity : Low Monitoring Cost -4.942 -3.700 -4.304
(4.752) (6.764) (3.599)
High Productivity : Period 0.721∗∗ 0.721∗ 0.417
(0.174) (0.341) (2.948)
Low Monitoring Cost : Period -0.070 -0.070 0.387
(0.174) (0.341) (0.320)
Random Effects Std. Dev. Subjects: Intercept 9.061 8.925
Random Effects Std. Dev. Subjects: Period 1.146 1.177
Correlation Random Effects Intercept - Period 0.340 0.317
Random Effects Std. Dev. Matching Group: Intercept 3.327 3.444
Residual Std. Error 13.280 8.409 8.442
Monitoring Probability Equation
Intercept 0.341∗∗ 0.337∗∗ 0.343∗∗
(0.011) (0.052) (0.066)
High Productivity 0.218∗∗ 0.227∗∗ 0.217∗
(0.016) (0.073) (0.108)
Low Monitoring Cost 0.209∗∗ 0.219∗∗ 0.206∗
(0.020) (0.075) (0.109)
Period -0.018∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.010
(0.006) (0.007) (0.019)
High Productivity : Low Monitoring Cost -0.156 -0.156 -0.133
(0.102) (0.111) (0.147)
High Productivity : Period 0.014∗ 0.014∗ 0.006
(0.006) (0.008) (0.029)
Low Monitoring Cost : Period 0.013∗ 0.013∗ 0.005
(0.006) (0.008) (0.030)
Random Effects Std. Dev. Subjects: Intercept 0.177 0.229
Random Effects Std. Dev. Subjects: Period 0.027 0.142
Correlation Random Effects Intercept - Period 0.395 0.005
Random Effects Std. Dev. Matching Group: Intercept 0.027 0.068
Residual Std. Error 0.289 0.202 0.202
Correlation Residual Errors Wage Eq. - Monitoring Prob. Eq. 0.323
Note: Numbers in brackets are standard errors. For the OLS estimates, standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and correlation of arbitrary form within matching groups (HC3 with clusters; see, e.g.,
MacKinnon and White, 1985). One and two stars indicate significance at the 5 and 1% level respectively.
Significance of coefficients of the multilevel models is derived from their simulated posterior distribution.
The OLS regressions have an adjusted R2 of R2wage = 0.23 and R2monitoring = 0.14.
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are just at the right level. This is also the only treatment in which average monitoring
probabilities are too low, otherwise they are rather close to the equilibrium (see also
figure 6). The observed distribution of wages and monitoring probabilities is, thus, a first
indication that employers may rely on or want to induce reciprocal behavior on the side
of the employees.
Having established that the between treatment variation in contracts is qualitatively
as predicted by the model, we need to verify whether the within treatment variation
is also in line with the normative prediction. Therefore, we compute the correlations
between monitoring probabilities and wage offers at the subject level. Since we cannot
assume that individual correlations are independent within a session we, again, estimate
the correlations in a multilevel model that allows for partial pooling and may thus im-
prove the efficiency of the estimates while accounting for the possible dependencies. The
multilevel model includes a grand mean for the correlations, treatment means that are
distributed around the grand mean, session means that are distributed around the re-
spective treatment means, and individual correlations that are distributed around the
session means. Monitoring probabilities and wages were rescaled before estimation of the
correlations, i.e. we substracted the subject-level means and divided by the subject-level
standard deviation; any time trends are partialled out.
Figure 2, depicting the distribution of individual correlations between monitoring
probabilities and wage offers, reveals a rather large heterogeneity. Individual estimates
range from almost perfect negative to almost perfect positive correlations. While only
11 subjects show a negative correlation, with only 3 being significantly negative, 43
subjects show a positive correlation, with 20 being significantly positive. The overall
average correlation is 0.26 (CI95% = (0.18, 0.33)). There are small differences between
treatments. In LPHM average correlation is highest with 0.43 (CI95% = (0.31, 0.54)),
in LPLM and HPHM it is 0.28 (CI95% = (0.11, 0.43), (0.19, 0.33)), and in HPLM it is
lowest with 0.07 (CI95% = (−0.06, 0.33), p = 0.091). It seems that the more favorable
the treatment is for the principal, the weaker is the complementarity of monitoring and
wages in his contract offers.
Wage offer and monitoring probability jointly determine the enforceable effort level. If
the desired effort level is equal to or lower than the enforceable effort level, the respective
employee should exert the desired effort level. Otherwise, full shirking maximizes her
payoff. Figure 3 presents a scatter-plot of desired, enforceable and actual effort levels. The
following observations emerge from the plot: First, most desired effort levels are higher
than the corresponding enforceable effort levels. In fact, in only 199 out of 795 accepted
contracts the desired effort level is enforceable. Second, there is some heterogeneity with
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Open circles represent individual raw correlations, closed circles are the correlations estimated from a
multilevel model, line segements cover the respective 95% credible intervals.
Figure 2: Distribution of individual correlations between monitoring probability and
wage offers
Table 4: Frequency of shirking decisions
Low Productivity High Productivity
Desired Effort Level Shirking No Shirking Shirking No Shirking
Enforceable 40 36 32 91
Not Enforceable 206 101 153 136
regard to effort exertion. While full shirking and exerting just the desired effort level
can be easily explained, other decisions either question the conditional rationality of
employees or are the result of reciprocity. Yet, despite of the heterogeneity, it is easy
to discern from figure 3 that a majority of the decisions is clustered either around the
predicted 45 degree line or at the zero-effort level.
According to a logistic regression on shirking frequencies (see table 4 for the frequen-
cies), where we control for repeated measurement and the offered contract, we observe
that there is less shirking in the high productivity treatments (likelihood ratio test;
p = 0.014) and – as one should expect – when the desired effort level is enforceable
(p < 0.001). Further, a logistic regression on shirking frequencies, where we restrict
the sample to include only the non-enforceable contracts, reveals that the probability
of shirking decreases with the monitoring probability (p < 0.001) and the offered rent
(p < 0.001), i. e. wage minus cost of desired effort. This is another piece of evidence
21
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Figure 3: Desired, enforceable and actual effort levels
corroborating the relevance of reciprocity in our experiment.
To further explore the impact of reciprocity considerations on effort choices we define
the amount of voluntary cooperation of an employee as the difference between her actual
effort choice and the conditional optimal effort choice given the accepted contract. In
figure 4 we show all data points, distinguishing between enforceable and non-enforceable
contracts. With non-enforceable contracts the amount of voluntary cooperation cannot
be negative. Although the data reveals some heterogeneity in decisions, we observe a
clear positive correlation of wages and voluntary cooperation under non-enforceable con-
tracts. Under enforceable contracts there is no such correlation. We, however, observe
that several agents shirk even under enforceable contracts (in 72 out of 199 cases).
To analyse reciprocity more formally we run a multilevel regression on the amount of
22
lll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
lll
l l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll l
l l
l
l
l
0 20 40 60 80
−
10
−
5
0
5
10
Wage Offer
Vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
Co
op
er
at
io
n non−enforceable contracts
enforceable contracts
Note: Circles denote the amount of voluntary cooperation under non-enforceable contracts while trian-
gles denote the amount of voluntary cooperation under enforceable contracts. Under non-enforceable
contracts the voluntary cooperation cannot be negative. The lines show local averages obtained by non-
parametric local fitting.
Figure 4: Voluntary cooperation under enforceable and non-enforceable contracts
voluntary cooperation. The regression model includes random intercepts for the matching
group and the individual subjects, treatment dummies, a dummy for zero monitoring, a
dummy for enforceable contracts, the wage, different random wage effects on the subjects
level for contracts with and without monitoring, the monitoring probability, the desired
effort, and the interaction between wage and zero monitoring as well as enforceable con-
tracts and the interaction between monitoring probability and the dummy for enforceable
contracts. The multilevel regression results are shown in table 5 together with the results
of a corresponding OLS model.
First, we observe no significant treatment effects. We also tested for possible in-
teraction effects of the treatments with the offered wage on the amount of voluntary
cooperation. Yet, none of the likelihood ratio tests suggested a significant interaction
effect.
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Table 5: OLS and multilevel regression on the amount of voluntary cooperation
OLS Multilevel
Coefficient Estimate Std.Error Estimate Std.Error
Intercept 3.192∗∗ 0.150 3.246∗∗ 0.390
High Productivity 0.745∗∗ 0.255 0.829 0.427
High Monitoring Cost 0.592 0.335 0.474 0.421
No Monitoring -1.927∗∗ 0.354 -1.718∗∗ 0.584
Enforceable Contract -5.432∗∗ 0.421 -5.559∗∗ 0.374
Wage 4.911∗∗ 0.809 4.200∗∗ 0.512
Monitoring Probability 1.804∗∗ 0.414 1.999∗∗ 0.428
Desired Effort -1.684∗∗ 0.470 -1.649∗∗ 0.445
Period -0.100∗ 0.046 -0.105∗∗ 0.027
Wage: No Monitoring -4.128∗∗ 1.007 -3.656∗∗ 0.752
Wage: Enforceable Contract -4.519∗∗ 0.917 -3.698∗∗ 0.669
Monitoring Prob: Enforceable Contract -2.420∗ 1.075 -2.802∗∗ 0.755
Random Effects Std. Dev. Subjects: Intercept 1.437
Random Effects Std. Dev. Subjects: Wage, p>0 1.781
Random Effects Std. Dev. Subjects: Wage, p=0 0.158
Random Effects Std. Dev. Matching Groups: Intercept 0.001
Residual Std. Error 3.419 3.006
For the OLS estimates, standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and correlation of arbitrary form
within matching groups (HC3 with clusters; see, e.g., MacKinnon and White, 1985). One and two stars
indicate significance at the 5 and 1% level respectively. Period is centered; all other continuous variables
are standardized, i.e. raw values are centered and divided by 2 standard deviations. The OLS regression
has an adjusted R2 of 0.43.
Second, there is a significant positive impact of wage on the amount of voluntary co-
operation when the principal monitors. A wage increase of one standard deviation (15.2)
leads to a voluntary increase in the effort level of about 2.1 units under monitoring con-
tracts – or a one unit wage increase leads to a 0.14 unit increase in voluntary cooperation.
The standard deviation of the random coefficient for the wage offer reveals that partic-
ipants react rather heterogeneously. Individual wage coefficients vary between 1.64 and
6.78 (cf. figure 5). Yet, if the principal does not monitor agents show no significant reac-
tion to the wage, and there is almost no heterogeneity in their reaction. Individual wage
coefficients under no monitoring range from 0.32 to 0.77 with none of these coefficients
being significantly different from 0. To induce any non-minimal effort choice principals
have to set a strictly positive monitoring probability. Indeed, under non-enforceable con-
tracts the amount of voluntary cooperation is increasing in the monitoring probability. A
24
lllllll l l lll lllll l lll l llll l l l llllll l l lllll lll lllll lllllllllll
l lll lll ll
Subject Index
W
a
ge
 C
oe
ffi
cie
nt
l
llll
ll l l l
ll llll
l l lll l llll
l l l llllll l l llll
l lll lllll
llllllllll
ll l
ll lll
l
l
1 20 40 70
−
2
0
2
4
6
8
The upper series depicts the wage coefficients under monitoring, the lower series the wage coefficent
under no monitoring, i.e. a monitoring probability of p = 0. Closed circles represent subjects who never
accepted a contract without monitoring, open circles represent subjects who accepted at least once a
contract without monitoring. Line segements depict the respective 95% credible intervals.
Figure 5: Distribution of individual wage coefficients in the regression on voluntary
cooperation
monitoring probability increase of one standard deviation (0.31) leads to a voluntary in-
crease in the effort level of about 1 unit. This effect is more than offset under enforceable
contracts.
Third, the positive effect of high wages is offset when the contract is enforceable.
Under this condition, there is no significant wage–voluntary cooperation relation. Due to
some shirking we observe, however, some negative voluntary cooperation independent of
the wage. Note that the amount of voluntary cooperation cannot be negative if contracts
are non-enforceable as any non-minimal effort is considered a voluntary cooperation.
As a result, given the same wage, actual effort choices are higher when contracts are
enforceable.
Finally, the desired effort level has a negative impact on voluntary cooperation. A
one standard deviation (3.55) increase in the desired effort level leads to a decrease of
0.82 units of voluntary cooperation.
The observation that under no monitoring there is also no voluntary cooperation–
wage correlation could be due to self-selection of types of subjects into types of contracts.
If mainly non-reciprocal participants choose contracts without monitoring, this would
explain the observed reduction in the wage–voluntary cooperation correlation. However,
our data do not support such a selection effect. 57% of participants in the experiment
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choose a contract without monitoring at least once. No participant chooses a contract
without monitoring more than five times. As figure 5 reveals, there are no systematic
differences in the individual wage coefficients in the regression on voluntary cooperation
between subjects that always choose contracts with some monitoring and subjects that at
least once choose a contract without monitoring. The average individual wage coefficient
for the 30 subjects that always choose to be monitored is 4.20. For the 40 subjects that
choose not to be monitored at least once it is 4.17. This small difference is statistically not
significant (t-test, p = 0.90). Both groups are characterized by the same distribution of
wage–voluntary cooperation coefficients (Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test, p = 0.68). We can,
therefore, conclude that to induce any non-minimal effort choice, principals have to set
a positive monitoring probability, and that this result of our experiment is not due to
self-selection of player types into types of contracts.
As the marginal effect of a wage increase on the principal’s benefits is below one for
all efforts below 1.12 and 2.69 for the low and high productivity treatment, respectively,
the principals fare best by implementing contracts that adhere to the normative solu-
tion of the shirking model. Relying on reciprocity alone does not pay. Given the same
wage, average per-round earnings are 5.6 (non-enforceable desired effort, p = 0.019) to
6.0 points (enforceable desired effort, p = 0.032) higher when the employer decides to
monitor. This explains why incentive contracts are predominant. In fact, in a multi-
level regression on the prinicpal’s profit similar to that reported earlier for voluntary
contributions the dummy for no monitoring is negative and highly significant while the
coefficient on monitoring probability is positive though not significant. A small non-zero
monitoring probability already goes a long way. Of course, jointly increasing wage offer
and monitoring probability boosts profits further.
Let us conclude the presentation of the experimental results with an analysis of
behavior over time. Figure 6 shows the mean offered wage, monitoring probability and
effort for all 15 periods. The offered wages are too high during the first periods. However,
except for he HPLM treatment, they decline over time and stabilize during the last third
of the experiment very close to the normative prediction. In HPLM the wages remain
too high during the entire experiment.
The corresponding mean monitoring probabilities start at about the right level, with
the exception of the HPLM treatment where the monitoring intensity is too low. In
this treatment the monitoring probability slightly increases over time, but stays below
the normative prediction. In the LPHM treatment, the mean monitoring probability
stays stable until period ten. Afterwards it decreases considerably below the normative
prediction. In the two other treatments the monitoring probability stays rather stable
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Figure 6: Mean offered wage, monitoring probability, and effort over time
Table 6: Number of (non-)enforceable desired effort levels over time
Effort Period
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
non-enforceable 33 32 42 40 44 45 44 39 41 45 39 43 43 42 39
enforceable 21 22 12 14 10 9 10 15 13 9 15 11 11 12 15
over the entire experiment. Though, it is slightly below the normative prediction during
the last few periods. The number of the resulting enforceable desired effort levels in
each period is given in table 6. Although the number seems to decline over time, the
trend is not significant on conventional levels (Chi-squared test for trend in proportions,
p = 0.056).
Finally, actual effort levels are close to the normative prediction during the first
half of the experiment in the low productivity treatments, but below afterwards due to
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the decrease in offered wages and monitoring probability. Average efforts in the HPHM
treatment are a bit more volatile but most times close to the normative prediction. There
is a slight downward trend that leads to efforts being below the normative prediction at
the end. In HPLM, the efforts are always considerably below the normative prediction,
which is mainly due to a too low monitoring probability and the too low wages offered
in later periods.
The described evolution of contracts and effort choices leads to no significant trend for
employers’ earnings (p = 0.245; Wald test, using a random effects regression on earnings
in euro), but to a slight decrease in employees’ earnings over time (about 3 euro-cents
per period; p < 0.001).
Although we again observe some variance, we can conclude that the overall ad-
justment processes go in the right direction with only a few exceptions. Especially the
predicted treatment differences become obvious over the course of the experiment.
7. Discussion
We set out on testing a shirking model in which the monitoring intensity arises en-
dogenously. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable
effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result,
monitoring and pay should be complements. The main question was, whether behavioral
regularities, i. e. reciprocal behavior, might be able to change the nature of these strategic
complementarities such that they are perceived and used as substitutes, as suggested by
fairness models.
To this end, we designed an experiment that has two distinctive features. First, in
contrast to earlier experiments that investigate shirking models, the monitoring inten-
sity in our experiment is endogenous. Instead of fixing a fine – that should be maximal,
given an exogenously fixed shirking detection probability – participants have to choose a
monitoring probability together with a wage level and a desired effort. Second, feasible
efforts are not restricted to a small set of discrete levels, but are chosen on a continu-
ous scale. Using a continuous effort is crucial for the prediction of the shirking model.
If effort were a discrete variable, say taking on only the values low or high, monitoring
and pay would become substitutes (see Allgulin and Ellingsen, 2002). Such an simplifi-
cation would, thus, alter the predictions of the model and lead to potentially misleading
implications for contractual design.
Though contracts are not as predicted by the normative solution of the shirking
model and do not converge perfectly to the predictions over the course of the experi-
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ment, the between treatment variation is qualitatively as predicted: High profitability
leads to higher wages and higher monitoring intensities, and high monitoring costs lead
to a reduction in both. However, wages are generally too high and the monitoring proba-
bility is too low, indicating that employers pay higher wages than implied by the standard
model. Analyzing the within treatment variation, we find a clear and highly significant
positive correlation between monitoring and pay. Thus, qualitatively the predictions of
the shirking model are confirmed: Monitoring and pay are complements. Given the rela-
tively high variance in our data, obtaining statistically significant treatment differences
can be viewed as a strong indication that the theoretical predictions are corroborated
experimentally. One intuitive behavioral explanation of why subjects in the role of the
employers might view monitoring and pay as complements is that they may have the feel-
ing that if they pay well, they have the moral right to check the quality of the work. Such
a reasoning – which is against the conventional wisdom – would imply that supervision
and wages, actually, become complements.
Nevertheless, we also have evidence for the existence of reciprocity. In a labor market
context, reciprocity is usually characterized by a positive wage- or rent-effort correlation,
which is the result of mutual gift-exchange (Akerlof, 1982). As the reciprocity idea implies
that intentions matter, we should observe less shirking with higher wages and a higher
wage-effort slope when contracts comprise zero monitoring. While the first effect is clearly
reflected in our data, we find no support for the second implication of reciprocity. On
the one hand, shirking rates decrease with higher wages, and the amount of voluntary
cooperation significantly increases with a higher wage. On the other hand, the latter is not
true when there is zero monitoring. Although this last observation is not easy to explain
in the framework of common fairness models, it was also observed by Fehr et al. (1996)
and Fehr and Gächter (2002). Consequently, one result of the shirking model, namely
that there must be a positive level of monitoring in order to induce any effort, certainly
prevails in an experimental test, and this result is not a consequence of self-selection of
types of players into types of contracts.
Accordingly, at least for the parameters and functions chosen in our experiment
relying on reciprocity alone does not pay off. The employer’s earnings are at least as
high when he designed a contract with enforceable effort as when he invested the same
amount of money in the labor relationship but offered a higher wage and monitors less.
This result is somewhat in contrast to recent findings by Falk and Kosfeld (2006), who
report that monitoring bears a hidden cost because agents react negatively to being
controlled. In their design, however, the principal can only restrict the choice set of
agents (this restriction captures the possibility of guaranteeing a minimal effort exertion
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through control) but not concurrently increase wages. Hence, supervision is always bound
to be perceived as distrust in the framework of Falk and Kosfeld (2006), which does not
have to be the case in our more general setup. Obviously, the perception of decisions
of principals play a crucial role in determining the level of reciprocity, and even subtle
design issues might influence this perception and, consequently, behaviorally optimal
contractual design.
Finally, as already Kirchler, Fehr and Evans (1996) observed, there is considerable
heterogeneity among decision makers. The wage-effort relation is by no means the same
for everyone. Even though the correlation is on average significantly positive, there is a
substantial number of participants who do not or almost not react to the wage, while
there are also participants who react very strongly to changes in the offered wage.
In summary, the answer to our question whether the social norm of reciprocity is
strong enough to change the complementary character of monitoring and pay as instru-
ments of contract design is negative (for the parameters that we use in our experiment
and for a one-shot interaction). The four treatment conditions that we put to a test span
a relatively large space of feasible parameter combinations. Note that other experiments
have shown that the positive effects of reciprocity are strongest for specific environments
in which, for instance, high productivities and complete certainty on payoff consequences
of one’s actions prevail. As these conditions are not (always) met in the real world, it
seems important to use different set-ups to learn more about the nature of reciprocity on
labor markets.
One final implication of our findings is that in relations between an employer and
an employee, already a low-intense incentive seems to go a long way. Even if it would be
optimal to establish strong monitoring mechanisms (e. g., when they are almost costless),
it might be a good idea to cut down monitoring to a lower intensity and provide some
contractual freedom. However, full trust and zero monitoring does not seem to induce
high enough levels of reciprocity to make it profitable, on average.
A. Appendix
A.1. Instructions
This is the translation of the instructions for the HPLM treatment. Instructions for the
other treatments are identical except for the parameter values and the exchange rate.
This experiment analyses economic behavior. During the experiment you and the
other participants will make decisions, and you will earn money. The amount of money
you earn depends on your own decisions as well as on the decisions of the other partici-
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pants and is determined by the rules of the game that will be explained in the following in
detail. At the end of the experiment your total profit will be privately paid to you in cash.
If you have any questions after reading the instructions please raise your hand. One of
the experimenters will come to you and answer your questions privately. All participants
receive identical instructions.
A.1.1. Types of participants
In the experiment, there are two types of participants: participants A and participants
B. It is most convenient for you if you view participants of type A as employers and
participants of type B as employees or workers. The assignment to the two roles is
completely random. You will learn your role on your screen at the beginning of the
experiment. You will remain in your role throughout the entire experiment.
A.1.2. Earnings
At the beginning of the experiment you receive 3 euro, contingent on answering a ques-
tionnaire about the rules of the experiment correctly. During the experiment you will
earn money by accumulating points. The accumulated points will be converted to euros
at the end of the experiment. The conversion rate is: 1 euro = 13 points. At the end of
the experiment all period profits will be added up an paid to you privately and in cash.
In case you make losses in the experiment – which is unlikely but possible – you have to
pay your losses to the experimenters. If you prefer not to participate in the experiment
under these rules, we would ask you to tell us now and to leave the room.
A.1.3. Duration
The whole experiment will last for about 90 minutes. It is divided into 15 periods. In
each period you will have to make decisions on the computer.
A.1.4. Anonymity
You will not learn the identity of the participants you are going to interact with, neither
during nor after the experiment. Other participants will not learn about your role, your
decisions and how much you earned. It is not allowed to talk during the experiment. You
are not allowed to use other functions of the computer than the experimental program.
Communication with others than the experimenters or manipulations on the computer
will lead to you being expelled from the experiment.
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A.1.5. Overview of course of action during the experiment
In each period of the experiment, an employer and an employee can conclude a trade.
There are 8 employers and 10 employees in the market. Your role remains unchanged
throughout the whole experiment. In each period, the course of action follows the same
procedure: Each of the 15 periods starts with an offer phase. During this phase the
employers have to submit offers that can, then, be accepted by employees. An offer
comprises the following three items whose consequences will be described in greater
detail later: A monitoring probability in the interval [0, 1] (with a maximum of three
digits after the comma); a wage in the interval [1, 83] (only integer numbers); and a
desired effort (=performance) in the interval [0.1, 12] (with a maximum of three digits
after the comma). For inserting this information the following screen will appear.
The upper part of the screen will allow you to calculate two important values: First,
you can calculate the costs of the monitoring probability contingent on your chosen
values (a higher monitoring probability causes higher costs for the employer). To conduct
the calculation you just have to pull the slider to the desired position and press the
"Calculate"-button. Then, the costs in points will be shown.
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Below, you can calculate how many points a desired effort would be worth for you (a
higher effort increases the profit of the employer) and which costs a desired effort would
cause for the employee who accepts your offer (a higher effort increases the costs for
the employee). You can use the slider and the "Calculate"-button as often as you wish.
When you finally inserted the values in the three fields and pressed the OK-button, your
contract offer is valid.
Offers of employers are public and can be seen by all employees. Employers cannot see
the offers of other employers, however. All employers have to submit an offer. Employers
can only submit one offer each period. Each participant can in every period conclude a
maximum of one trade. Since there are 8 employers and 10 employees, at least 2 employees
remain without a trade in any period.
After all employers will have submitted their offers, the acceptance phase will start.
In this phase, employees will be able to accept offers submitted by employers. During
this phase, employees see the screen with the contract offer in consecutive but randomly
determined order. In each period this random order will be newly determined. Each
employee can, then, in the course of 20 seconds decide which contract offer to accept,
or to decline all standing offers. Accepted offers will be deleted from the screen for the
subsequent employees. During this phase, employees will see the following screen:
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You can activate single contract offers by clicking on them (they will, then, be shaded
in blue) and accept them by clicking the OK-button. If you do not want to accept any
of the offers, please click on the "No contract"-button. After 20 seconds the possibility
to accept offers ceases for the employee. If you have not accepted an offer by then, you
will remain without a trade in this period.
It is straightforward to view the offer and acceptance phases as a labor market, on
which employers make offers on work contracts (consisting of the monitoring probability,
a wage and a desired effort). Employees can either accept one of these offers or decline
all of them.
After the acceptance phase all employees who have concluded a trade have to submit
an actual effort level to the employer they have contracted with. For the employees the
desired effort level by the employers are NOT binding. You will see the following screen:
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Employees can also use a slider and a "Calculate"-button on their screen to calculate
the costs of effort, their period profit and the period profit of the employer for the chosen
effort level. Again, the "Calculate"-button can be used as often as wished. After the
OK-button will finally have been clicked, the chosen effort will, then, be valid. After all
employees have chosen their efforts, period profits are determined and you will learn all
important values as well as your period profit on a separate screen. Then, a new period
starts.
A.1.6. How profits are calculated
Profits of employers If an employer has not concluded a trade in a period (because
nobody accepted it), she will earn a profit of 0 points in that period. If an offer has been
accepted, the profit depends on the wage, the monitoring probability and the actual effort
determined by the employee. The profit will be determined according to the following
formulae:
1st possibility: The random mechanism has determined that there is no monitoring,
or the actual effort was at least as high as the desired effort: Profit employer = 16*(actual
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effort)(2/3)- 20*(monitoring probability)2 - wage
2nd possibility: The random mechanism has determined that monitoring takes place
and the actual effort was lower than the desired effort: Profit employer = 16*(actual
effort)(2/3)- 20*(monitoring probability)2 - 1
As it is apparent from the formulae, the profit of the employer is the higher, the
higher the actual effort determined by the employee, the lower the chosen wage and the
lower the chosen monitoring probability.
Note that you do not have to use the formula to calculate profits! The slider and
the "Calculate"-button helps you to decide without having to do the calculations for
yourself.
Profits of employees If an employee has not concluded a trade in a period , she will
earn a profit of 0 points in that period.
If the actually chosen effort is at least as high as the desired effort submitted by the
employer, or if the random mechanism decided not to monitor, then: Profit employee =
wage - (actual effort)(3/2)
If the actually chosen effort is lower than the desired effort submitted by the employer
and the random mechanism decided to monitor, then: Profit employee = 1 - (actual
effort)(3/2)
Hence, the computer decides randomly according to the monitoring probability that
is chosen by the employer whether to monitor or not. If the actual effort is at least as high
as the desired effort, monitoring has, of course, no consequences. In case the actual effort
is smaller than the desired effort, the profit depends on whether the random mechanism
decides to monitor or not.
Again, note that you do not have to use the formula to calculate profits! The slider
and the "Calculate"-button helps you to decide without having to do the calculations for
yourself.
Profits of all employers and employees are determined in the same way. Each employer
can, therefore, calculate the profit of the employee with whom she concluded a trade,
and each employee can calculate the profit of the employer with whom she concluded a
trade.
After each period you learn as employer: the actual effort chosen by the employee
(in case you concluded a trade) and your period profit. After each period you learn as
employee: whether you have been monitored or not (in case you concluded a trade) and
your period profit.
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Note finally that both employers and employees can also make losses in each of the 15
periods. You have to cover these losses out of the 3 euros you will earn at the beginning
of the experiment or out of profits in other periods. Your round profits will be added up
over the 15 rounds and paid to you at the end of the experiment privately and in cash.
A.1.7. Questionnaire
Question 1: The offer of an employer was not accepted by any of the employees. What
is her profit in this round?
Question 2: An employee has not accepted any offer. What is her profit in this round?
Question 3: An employer chose a monitoring probability of 0 and a wage of 30. The
(actual effort)(3/2) chosen by the employee was 2. What is the profit of the employee
in this period?
Question 4: An employer chose a monitoring probability of 0.5, a wage of 20 and a
desired effort of 5. The actual effort chosen by the employee was 4. The random
mechanism chose to monitor the employee. What is the profit of the employee in
this period? (note: 4(3/2) = 8)
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